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Abstract. We study the problem of designing prediction markets for
random variables with continuous or countably innite outcomes on the
real line. Our interval betting languages allow traders to bet on any inter-
val of their choice. Both the call market mechanism and two automated
market maker mechanisms, logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) and
dynamic parimutuel markets (DPM), are generalized to handle interval
bets on continuous or countably innite outcomes. We examine problems
associated with operating these markets. We show that the auctioneer's
order matching problem for interval bets can be solved in polynomial
time for call markets. DPM can be generalized to deal with interval bets
on both countably innite and continuous outcomes and remains to have
bounded loss. However, in a continuous-outcome DPM, a trader may in-
cur loss even if the true outcome is within her betting interval. The
LMSR market maker suers from unbounded loss for both countably
innite and continuous outcomes.
Key words: Prediction Markets, Combinatorial Prediction Markets,
Expressive Betting
1 Introduction
Prediction markets are speculative markets created for forecasting random vari-
ables. In practice, they have been shown to provide remarkably accurate proba-
bilistic forecasts [1,2]. Existing prediction markets mainly focus on providing an
aggregated probability mass function for a random variable with nite outcomes
or discretized to have nite outcomes. For example, to predict the future printer
sales level, the value of which lies on the positive real line, Hewlett-Packard's
sales prediction markets partition the range of the sales level into about 10 ex-
clusive intervals, each having an assigned Arrow-Debreu security that pays o $1
if and only if the future sales level falls into the corresponding interval [3]. The
price of each security represents the market probability that the sales level is
within the corresponding interval. The set of prices provides a probability mass
function for the discretized random variable.
However, many random variables of interest have continuous or countably
innite outcome spaces. For example, the carbon dioxide emission level in a cer-
tain period of time can be thought of as a continuous random variable on the
positive real line; the printer sales level can be treated as a random variable with
? Part of this work was done while Yiling Chen was at Yahoo! Research.countably innite outcomes, taking positive integer values. Discretizing such ran-
dom variables into nite outcomes can potentially hurt information aggregation,
as market participants may have information that can not be easily expressed
with the ex-ante specied discretization. It is desirable to provide more expres-
sive betting languages so that market participants can express their information
more accurately and preferably in the same way they possess it.
In this paper, we design and study prediction market mechanisms for pre-
dicting random variables with continuous or countably innite outcomes on the
real line. We provide betting languages that allow market participants to bet
on any interval of their choice and create the security on the y. We generalize
both the call market mechanism and two automated market maker mechanisms,
logarithmic market scoring rules (LMSR) [4] and dynamic parimutuel markets
(DPM) [5,6], to handle interval bets on continuous or countably innite out-
comes, and examine problems associated with operating these markets. We show
that the auctioneer's order matching problem can be solved in polynomial time
for call markets. DPM can be generalized to deal with interval bets on both
countably innite and continuous outcomes and remains to have bounded loss.
However, in a continuous-outcome DPM, a trader may incur loss even if the
interval she bets on includes the true outcome. The LMSR market maker suers
from unbounded loss for both countably innite and continuous outcomes. Due
to space constraints, the Appendix is omitted and available upon request.
Related Work. Our work is situated in the broad framework of designing
combinatorial prediction market mechanisms that provide more expressiveness
to market participants. Various betting languages for permutation combinatorics
have been studied for call markets, including subset betting and pair betting [7],
singleton betting [8], and proportional betting [9]. Fortnow et al. [10] analyzed
betting on Boolean combinatorics in call markets. For LMSR market makers,
Chen et al. [11] showed that computing the contract price is #P-hard for subset
betting, pair betting, and Boolean formulas of two events. In a tournament
setting, pricing in LMSR becomes tractable for some restricted Boolean betting
languages [12]. Yoopick is a combinatorial prediction market implementation of
LMSR that allows traders to bet on point spreads of their choice for sporting
events [13]. It is implemented as a LMSR with a large number of nite outcomes.
Agrawal et al. [14] proposed Quad-SCPM, which is a market maker mechanism
that has the same worst-case loss as a quadratic scoring rule market maker.
Quad-SCPM may be used for interval bets on countably innite outcomes since
its worst-case loss does not increase with the size of the outcome space.
2 Background
In this section, we briey introduce three market mechanisms that have been
used by prediction markets to predict random variables with nite outcomes.
2.1 Call Markets
A call market is an auctioneer mechanism, where the auctioneer (market insti-
tution) risklessly matches received orders. In a call market, participants submitbuy or sell orders for individual contracts. All orders are assembled at one time
in order to determine a market clearing price at which demand equals supply.
Buy orders whose bid prices are higher than the clearing price and sell orders
whose ask prices are lower than the clearing price are accepted. All transactions
occur at the market clearing price. Most call markets are bilateral | matching
buy and sell orders of the same contract. For multi-outcome events, call mar-
kets can be multilateral | allowing participants to submit orders on dierent
contracts and performing global order matching [15{18].
2.2 Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules
Let v be a random variable with N mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes.
A logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) [4,19] is an automated market maker
that subsidizes trading to predict the likelihood of each outcome. An LMSR
market maker oers n contracts, each corresponding to one outcome and paying
$1 if the outcome is realized [4,20]. Let qi be the total quantity of contract i
held by all traders combined, and let q be the vector of all quantities held. The
market maker utilizes a cost function C(q) = blog
PN
j=1 eqj=b that records the
total amount of money traders have spent. A trader that wants to buy any bundle
of contracts such that the total number of outstanding shares changes from q
to ~ q must pay C(~ q)   C(q) dollars. Negative quantities encode sell orders and
negative \payments" encode sale proceeds earned by the trader. At any time,
the instantaneous price of contract i is pi(q) = e
qi=b
PN
j=1 e
qj=b, representing the cost
per share of purchasing an innitesimal quantity. An LMSR is built upon the
logarithmic scoring rule, si(r) = blog(ri). It is known that if the market maker
starts the market with a uniform distribution its worst-case loss is bounded by
blogN.
2.3 Dynamic Parimutuel Markets
A dynamic parimutuel market (DPM) [5,6] is a dynamic-cost variant of a pari-
mutuel market. From a trader's perspective, DPM acts as a market maker in
a similar way to LMSR. There are N securities oered in the market, each
corresponding to an outcome of the random variable. The cost function of the
market maker, which captures the total money wagered in the market, is C(q) =

qPN
j=1 q2
j, while the instantaneous price for contract i is pi(q) =
qi qPN
j=1 q2
j
,
where  is a free parameter. Unlike in LMSR, the contract payo in DPM is not
a xed $1. If outcome i happens and the quantity vector at the end of the market
is q f, the payo per share of the winning security is oi =
C(q
f)
q
f
i
=

qP
j(q
f
j )2
q
f
i
.
A nice property of DPM is that if a trader wagers on the correct outcome, she
is guaranteed to have non-negative prot, because pi is always less than or equal
to  and oi is always greater than or equal to . Because the price functions
are not well-dened when q = 0, the market maker must begin with a non-zero
quantity vector q 0. Hence, the market maker's loss is bounded by C(q 0).3 Call Markets for Interval Betting
For a random variable X that has continuous or countably innite outcomes
on the real line, we consider the betting language that allows traders to bet on
any interval (l;u) of their choice on the real line and create a security for the
interval on the y. The security pays o $1 per share when the betting interval
contains the realized value of X. For countably innite outcomes, the interval is
interpreted as a set of outcomes that lie within the interval.
Suppose that the range of X is (L, U) where L 2 < [ f 1g and U 2 < [
f+1g. Traders submit buy orders. Each order i 2 O is dened by (bi;qi;li;ui),
where bi denotes the bid price for a unit share of the security on interval (li;ui),
and qi denotes the number of shares of the security to purchase at price bi. We
note li  L and ui  U. Given a set of orders O submitted to the auctioneer, the
auctioneer needs to decide which orders can be risklessly accepted. We consider
the auctioneer's problem of nding an optimal match to maximize its worst-case
prot given a set of orders O.
We rst dene the state space S to be the partition of the range of X formed
by orders O. For any order i 2 O, (li;ui) denes 2 boundary points of the
partition. Let A = ([i2Oli)[fLg be the set of left ends of all intervals in O and
the left end of the range of X, and B = ([i2Oui) [fUg be the set of right ends
of all intervals in O and the right end of the range of X. We rank all elements of
A and B in order of increasing values, and denote the i-th element as ei. Clearly,
e1 = L and ejAj+jBj = U. We formally dene the state space S as follows.
Denition 1. Let si 2 S be the i-th element of the state space S for all 1 
i  (jAj+jBj 1). If ei = ei+1, then si = feig. Otherwise, si = (ei;ei+1] if both
ei 2 A and ei+1 2 A; si = (ei;ei+1) if ei 2 A and ei+1 2 B; si = [ei;ei+1] if
ei 2 B and ei+1 2 A; and si = [ei;ei+1) if ei 2 B and ei+1 2 B.
Because jSj = jAj+jBj 1, jAj  jOj+1, and jBj  jOj+1, we have jSj  2jOj+1.
With the denition of states given orders O, we formulate the auctioneer's
optimal match problem as a linear program, analogous to the one used for per-
mutation betting [7].
Denition 2 (Optimal Match). Given a set of order O, choose xi 2 [0;1]
such that the following linear program is optimized.
max
xi;c c (1)
s.t.
P
i (bi   Ii(s))qixi  c; 8s 2 S
0  xi  1; 8i 2 O
Ii(s) is the indicator variable for whether order i is winning in state s. Ii(s) = 1
if the order gets a payo of $1 in s and Ii(s) = 0 otherwise. The variable c
represents the worst-case prot for the auctioneer, and xi 2 [0;1] represents the
fraction of order i 2 O that is accepted. As the number of structural constraints
is at most 2jOj+1 and the number of variables is jOj, (1) can be solved eciently.
We state it in the following theorem.Theorem 3. For call markets, the auctioneer's optimal order matching problem
for interval betting on countably innite and continuous outcomes can be solved
in polynomial time.
Thus, if the optimal solution to (1) generates positive worst-case prot c, the
auctioneer accepts orders according to the solution. Otherwise, when c  0, the
auctioneer rejects all orders.
When there are few traders in the market, nding a counterpart to trade
in a call market may be hard and the market may suer from the thin market
problem. Allowing traders to bet on dierent intervals further exacerbates the
problem by dividing traders' attention among a large number of subsets of secu-
rities, making the likelihood of nding a multi-lateral match even more remote.
In addition, call markets are zero-sum games and hence are challenged by the
no-trade theorem [21]. In the next two sections, we examine market maker mech-
anisms, which not only provide innite liquidity but also subsidize trading, for
interval betting.
4 Dynamic Parimutuel Markets for Interval Betting
For interval betting in DPMs, traders also create a security on the y by choosing
an interval (l;u). However, the payo of the security is not xed to be $1. Instead,
each share of the security whose interval contains the realized value of the random
variable entitles its holder to an equal share of the total money in the market. We
generalize DPM to allow for (but not limited to) interval betting on countably
innite and continuous outcomes. The problem that we consider is whether these
mechanisms still ensure the bounded loss of the market maker.
4.1 Innite-Outcome DPM
We generalize DPM to allow for countably innite outcomes, and call the re-
sulting mechanism innite-outcome DPM. In an innite-outcome DPM, the un-
derlying forecast variable can have countably innite mutually exclusive and
exhaustive outcomes. Each state security corresponds to one potential outcome.
An interval bet often includes a set of state securities. The market maker keeps
track of the quantity vector of outstanding state securities, still denoted as q,
which is a vector of dimension 1. The cost and price functions for the innite-
outcome DPM are CI(q) = 
qP1
j=1 q2
j; and pI
i(q) =
qi pP1
j=1 q2
j
. The payo
per winning security if outcome i happens is oI
i =

qP1
j=1(q
f
j )2
q
f
i
.
The loss of the market maker in an innite-outcome DPM is still her cost
to initiate the market. The market maker needs to choose an initial quantity
vector q0 such that her loss CI(q0) is nite. In practice, an innite-outcome
DPM market maker can start with a quantity vector that has only nite positive
elements and all others are zeros, or use an innite converging series. Whenever
a trader purchases a state security whose current price is zero or that has notbeen purchased before, the market maker begins to track quantity and calculate
price for that security. Hence, innite-outcome DPM can be operated as a nite-
outcome DPM that can add new state securities as needed. The market maker
does not need to record quantities and calculate prices for all innite outcomes,
but only for those having outstanding shares. Innite-outcome DPM maintains
the desirable price-payo relationship of DPM | the payo of a security is
always greater than or equal to  and its price is always less than or equal to .
4.2 Continuous-Outcome DPM
We then generalize DPM to allow for continuous outcomes, and call the re-
sulting mechanism continuous-outcome DPM. The cost and price functions of a
continuous-outcome DPM are C = 
qR +1
 1 q(y)2 dy and p(x) =
q(x) qR +1
 1 q(y)2 dy
.
A trader can buy  shares of an interval (l;u). The market maker then increases
q(x) by  for all x 2 (l;u). The trader's payment equals the change in value
of the cost function. However, strictly speaking, function p(x) does not repre-
sent price, but is better interpreted as a density function. The instantaneous
price for buying innitely small amounts of the security for interval (l;u) is
p(l;u) =
R u
l p(x)dx =

R u
l q(x)dx
qR +1
 1 q(y)2 dy
. If the realized value of the random vari-
able is x, each share of a security on any interval that contains x has payo
o(x) = C
qf(x) =

qR +1
 1 qf(y)2 dy
qf(x) , where qf(y) is the number of outstanding
shares for securities whose interval contains y at the close of the market.
A continuous-outcome DPM market maker can choose an initial quantity
distribution q0(x) such that her loss is nite. However, the desirable price-payo
relationship that holds for the original DPM no longer holds for continuous-
outcome DPM. A trader who bets on the correct outcome may still lose money.
Theorem 4 states the price-payo relationship for continuous-outcome DPM.
Proof of the theorem is provided in Appendix A.
Theorem 4. The price per share for buying a security on interval (l;u) is al-
ways less than or equal to 
p
u   l. If traders can bet on any non-empty open
interval, the payo per share is bounded below by 0. If traders could bet only on
open intervals of size at least z, the payo per share is bounded below by 
p
2z
2 .
5 Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule for Interval Betting
For LMSR, we dene the same interval betting language as in call markets. A
trader can create a security by specifying an interval (l;u) to bet on. If the
realized value of X falls into the interval, the security pays o $1 per share. We
generalize LMSR to allow countably innite and continuous outcomes and study
whether the market maker still has bounded loss.
LMSR for nite outcomes can be extended to accommodate interval betting
on countably innite outcomes simply by changing the summations in the priceand cost functions to include all countably innite outcomes. However, as the
LMSR market maker's worst-case loss is blogN, the market maker's worst-case
loss is unbounded as N approaches 1.
We generalize LMSR to accommodate continuous outcome spaces. A loga-
rithmic scoring rule for a continuous random variable is s(r(x)) = blog(r(x))
where x is the realized value for the random variable and r(x) is the reported
probability density function for the random variable evaluated at x. Using an
equation system similar to the one proposed by Chen and Pennock [20], we de-
rive the corresponding price and cost functions for the continuous logarithmic
scoring rule: C = blog(
R +1
 1 eq(y)=bdy), and p(x) = e
q(x)=b
R +1
 1 eq(y)=bdy. Here, p(x)
does not represent price, but is best interpreted as a density function. The in-
stantaneous price for buying innitely small amounts of the security for interval
(l;u) is
R u
l p(x)dx. If the interval (l;u) contains the realized value, one share of
the security entitles its holder $1 payo.
However, the worst-case loss is still unbounded for a continuous LMSR mar-
ket maker even with the restriction on the size of allowable intervals, as shown
by Theorem 5. Proof of the theorem is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 5. A continuous logarithmic market scoring rule market maker has
unbounded worst-case loss, with or without the restriction that traders can bet
only on intervals of size at least z.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
We study interval betting on random variables with continuous or countably
innite outcomes for call markets, DPM, and LMSR. We show that the auction-
eer's order matching problem in call markets can be solved in polynomial time
for interval bets. DPM can be generalized to handle both countably innite and
continuous outcomes. Unfortunately, in a continuous-outcome DPM, a trader
may incur loss even if her betting interval contains the true outcome. LMSR
market makers, however, suer from unbounded loss for both countably innite
and continuous outcomes.
One important future direction is to design automated market maker mech-
anisms with desirable properties, especially bounded loss, when handling con-
tinuous outcome spaces. In particular, it may be fruitful to explore interval bets
with variable payos for outcomes within the interval. The interval contracts for
call markets and LMSR give the same payo as long as the outcome falls within
the specied interval. Implicitly, this assumes that a trader's prediction of the
random variable is a uniform distribution over the given interval. Alternatively,
it would be interesting to allow for the trader's probability distribution of the
random variable to take other shapes over the given interval, and hence to allow
payos to vary correspondingly for outcomes within the interval.
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Proof. By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
Z u
l
q(x)dx
2

Z u
l
q(x)2 dx
Z u
l
12 dx = (u   l)
Z u
l
q(x)2 dx:
Hence,
Z u
l
q(x)dx 
s
(u   l)
Z u
l
q(x)2 dx: (2)
The price of buying a security on interval (l;u) is then
p(l;u) =

R u
l q(x)dx
qR +1
 1 q(y)2 dy


R u
l q(x)dx
qR u
l q(y)2 dy
 
p
u   l:
Suppose the smallest partition that includes the true outcome x at the end
of the market is (c;d). qf(x) = qf(x) for all x 2 (c;d). Then, payo per share
is
o(x) =

qR +1
 1 qf(y)2 dy
qf(x)


qR d
c qf(y)2 dy
qf(x)
=

p
qf(x)2(d   c)
qf(x)
= 
p
d   c: (3)
If traders can bet on any non-empty interval, (d   c) in (3) may approach 0.
Thus, payo per share o(x) > 0.
If the market maker restricts that traders can only bet on intervals no smaller
than z, we consider the interval (d z;c+z) for the case of (d c) < z. Because
(c;d) is the smallest partition that contains x,
qf(x) =
R d
c qf(x)dx
d   c
: (4)
Any time when
R d
c q(x)dx is increased by a, it must be the case that
R c
d z q(x)dx +
R c+z
d q(x)dx is increased at least by a
d c (z   (d   c)), because
the smallest interval size is z. Hence,
Z c
d z
qf(x)dx +
Z c+z
d
qf(x)dx 
R d
c qf(x)dx
d   c
(z   (d   c)):Thus,
Z c+z
d z
qf(x)dx 
R d
c qf(x)dx
d   c
(z   (d   c)) +
Z d
c
qf(x)dx
=
z
d   c
Z d
c
qf(x)dx: (5)
Payo per share is
o(x) =

qR +1
 1 qf(y)2 dy
qf(x)
=
(d   c)
qR +1
 1 qf(y)2 dy
R d
c qf(x)dx

(d   c)
qR c+z
d z qf(y)2 dy
R d
c qf(x)dx

(d   c)
R c+z
d z qf(y)dy
p
(c + z)   (d   z)
R d
c qf(x)dx

(d   c) z
d c
R d
c qf(y)dy
p
(c + z)   (d   z)
R d
c qf(x)dx
=
z
p
2z   (d   c)
>

p
2z
2
:
The second equality comes from (4). The fourth inequality is a result of applying
(2). Applying (5), we get the fth inequality. Letting (d c) ! 0, we obtain the
last inequality.
B Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Let x be the realized value of the random variable. Let p0(x) and pf(x)
be the initial and nal price density for x. Then, the market maker's loss is
blogpf(x)   blogp0(x).Suppose the smallest partition that includes the true outcome x at the end
of the market is (c;d). If traders can bet on any non-empty intervals,
pf(x) =
eq
f(x
)=b
R +1
 1 eqf(y)=bdy

eq
f(x
)=b
R d
c eqf(y)=bdy
=
eq
f(x
)=b
(d   c)eqf(x)=b =
1
d   c
:
As (d   c) approaches 0, 1
d c approaches 1. Hence, the worst-cast loss is not
bounded because blogpf(x) < 1.
If the smallest interval that traders can bet on is of size z, consider the
situation that (d   c) < z and traders buying equal shares of intervals (d   z;d)
and (c;c + z). Then,
pf(x) =
eq
f(x
)=b
R +1
 1 eqf(y)=bdy

eq
f(x
)=b
R c
d z eqf(y)=bdy +
R d
c eqf(y)=bdy +
R c+z
d eqf(y)=bdy
=
eq
f(x
)=b
2(z   (d   c))eqf(x)=2b + (d   c)eqf(x)=b
=
1
2(z   (d   c))e qf(x)=2b + (d   c)
:
When qf(x) ! 1 and (d c) ! 0, the pf(x) approaches to 0 according to the
above expression. Hence, the worst-case loss of the market maker is not bounded
because blogpf(x) < 1.